Will Eastern Ukraine become Crimea 2.0?

After weeks of speculations, the phantom of separatism in Ukraine is back. Heavily armed gunmen have stormed various official buildings in the main cities of the country’s east. The striking similitudes with the tensions experienced in Crimea in the last month are by no means coincidental. First, unidentified paramilitary troops have occupied several public buildings to then proclaim the independence of the region. At the same time arms depots are being stormed, weapons are distributed amongst the rebels and key strategic positions are being taken control of. Presumably, the next step will entail the call for a referendum on independence that will eventually lead parts of Eastern Ukraine to join the Russian Federation.

Whilst tensions in Eastern Ukraine rise, the rift between the West and Russia is also increasing. The last meeting of the UN Security Council resulted in an exchange of accusations between Western powers on the one hand, and Russia on the other. EU foreign ministers met to discuss the new crisis on Monday, while the US is increasing the tone of its discourse and has accused Russia of destabilizing Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia has warned the West that it is in its hands to avoid a civil war. In light of this, Ukraine seems yet again condemned to an imminent break-up of its territory.

Many observe the situation with perplexity and a feeling of impotence. What, if anything, can be done to avoid this crisis to escalate even further?

Somewhat disconcertingly, both the West and the government in Kiev have again been taken by surprise by the speed of the events, even though analysts have been speculating with the current scenario for weeks. Many in the West are reluctant to pursue a harder line against Russia due to fears of Russian retaliation. This is especially evident in countries like Germany, Hungary, Slovakia or Greece that are heavily dependent on Russian gas, but not so in Poland or the Baltic states who have instead opted for a firmer stance vis-à-vis Russia. Moscow is also successfully blackmailing the West, reminding it of its own inconsistencies in Iraq, Kosovo or Libya. The decisions made by the West in the past are thus backfiring in a crucial moment that requires proactive involvement and leadership, not remorse.

However, past mistakes should not stop the West from finding creative solutions to the crisis. In fact, the US and to a larger extent the EU can still contribute to a peaceful outcome, but this will require more than good faith. Most importantly, it will demand a clear roadmap that leads to an immediate de-escalation of the situation in the short term and to the stabilization of Ukraine in the longer run. And this, in turn, involves pragmatism towards Russia.

Yet de-escalation should not be confused with backing down. Indeed, the West’s reluctance to oppose Putin’s moves in Crimea has largely contributed to the current crisis. While the US has been keen to impose sanctions on Russian officials and entities, the EU’s response has been very mild so far. As could be expected, yesterday’s EU Foreign Affairs Council only agreed to add new names to the EU’s sanctions blacklists. Such strategy will hardly impose any costs on Russia, who is anyways willing to go further in its destabilization efforts. The West’s division and its symbolic response to Russian expansionism are sending an unmistakeable message to Putin, who is currently putting the West under a new stress test.

Paradoxically as it might be though, de-escalation might only be achieved through a combination of carrots and sticks. Sanctioning Russia without offering it any incentive to solve the current crisis is, simply put, a waste of time. Conversely, buying time for negotiations while imposing symbolic yet ineffective sanctions such as visa bans and assets freezes won’t do the trick either. In fact, these measures might simply look absurd and obsolete when the foreign ministers of the US, Russia, Ukraine and Catherine Ashton meet this Thursday in Geneva.

The West needs to understand that the stakes are high for Russia and that any coercive act will lead nowhere unless the concerns of Moscow are taken into consideration. Yet at the same time it needs to accept that the only way of negotiating with Putin is by levelling the playing field. This implies two things. First, the US and the EU need to get Russia on the negotiation table and make sure that it is part of the solution, not the problem. Although many would like to leave Russia out of the equation, this is neither possible, nor desirable. At the same time, the West needs to tell Putin that not playing along will have severe economic and political costs for Russia.

Finally, de-escalation will entail a huge diplomatic effort to make sure that Russia takes part and actively supports the elections of the 25^th of May. After all, only a newly elected government can claim the legitimacy that the acting Ukrainian government lacks. Ideally, the elections should be supervised by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – that is, with Russia on board – and give way to a government of national unity to avoid exclusionary politics. In turn, the new government should commit to respect the rights of Russian and other minorities, promote decentralization and grant more autonomy to certain regions and, most importantly, generate economic growth and political stability. EU financial assistance could be a stepping stone in this direction.

However, the 25^th of May is still far away. Until then, the situation could deteriorate quickly and Eastern Ukraine could become Crimea 2.0. Whether this will be the case will largely depend on the West’s capacity to act swiftly and convincingly to anticipate Putin’s moves and take the diplomatic initiative. Unfortunately, time is not on the West’s side.