Planning, planning, planning...

Todo proyecto tiene que empezar por algún lado, y en mi caso, empezó por comprar los mapas de GR-11. A partir de ahí, dio comienzo la planificación de verdad. Preguntas como cuántos días caminaría, en qué pueblos, albergues o refugios pernoctaría, qué distancia recorrería en un día, y sobre todo, qué tipo de material necesitaría, irrumpían de repente en mi lista de prioridades.

Planificando la ruta.

No se trata de preguntas triviales, ya que caminar grandes distancias superando fuertes desniveles a diario no solamente requiere una buena preparación física; también requiere una buena planificación para poder completar esta aventura de forma exitosa, segura, y sobre todo, para poder disfrutarla al máximo.

Así que nada más disponer de los mapas y sabiendo que en esta ocasión tan solo dispondría de unos 12 días - el recorrido entero del GR-11 suele realizarse en unos 40 días de marcha -, pude empezar a analizar distancias y posibles finales de etapa desde los que poder volver en transporte público hasta Barcelona (y de ahí volar hasta Bruselas).

En principio, contaba con 10 días de ruta, además de dos días para viajar desde Bruselas a Hendaya y desde Barcelona a Bruselas). Sin embargo, la cosa se complicaba  al explorar la posibilidad de ascender algún pico, como el emblemático Bisaurín en Aragón - el primer pico notorio de los Pirineos viniendo desde el oeste, y un gran mirador sobre la región. Asimismo, es necesario plantear alternativas a la ruta normal en caso de mal tiempo, lesiones, o cansancio acumulado.

Una vez resueltos estos rompecabezas, la segunda preocupación radica en el material necesario. Ésta es una consideración importante, pues cada gramo adicional se notaría en los fuertes desniveles que me esperan, por lo que resulta sumamente importante limitar el peso que cargaré sobre mis espaldas al mínimo posible. ¿Que tamaño debería tener la mochila? ¿Cuánta ropa necesitaría? ¿Comida, agua, saco, hornillo, tienda de campanya, botiquín, etc.?

Mi equipo de supervivencia

Afortunadamente, en la era de las tecnologías gran parte de estas dudas pueden resolverse rápidamente con unos cuantos clicks en internet y, especialmente, en los foros de montañas donde gente como yo ha tenido la amabilidad de compartir sus propias experiencias en el GR-11.

Una de las decisiones mas importantes radica en si conviene llevar tienda de campañaa o no. Tras dudar sobre si valdría la pena cargar con el peso de una tienda de campaña teniendo en cuenta que a lo largo del recorrido existen muchos refugios de montaña, finalmente me convencí de que la tienda me ofrecería mucha flexibilidad y que, en caso de no lograr llegar al destino final durante una etapa debido al mal tiempo o al cansancio, la tienda sería un seguro de vida. Tomada la decision, me puse a buscar una tienda unipersonal ligera, y que no fuera excesivamente cara. Buscando por internet, me decanté finalmente por una tienda que pesaba aproximadamente 1kg, y que podría montar utilizando mis bastones telescópicos. Asimismo, necesitaría una esterilla (inflable), y un saco de dormir ligero, pero con una temperatura de confort de unos 12 grados centígrados, ya que las temperaturas en los Pirineos pueden caer drásticamente durante la noche.

También tuve que tomar la difícil decisión de dejar mi cámara réflex en casa y sustituirla por una  cámara compacta más pequeña y ligera (¡esta fue, sin duda, una decisión de la que no me arrepentiría más adelante!).

En tercer lugar, la ropa: dos mudas (lavaría una muda a diario), un polar, una chaqueta goretex ligera, pantalón impermeable, guantes y gorra. Además, llevaría unas sandalias para aliviar mis pies al final de cada jornada, y otros utensilios como un hornillo, un frontal, botiquín, 2 litros de agua, barritas energéticas y geles, gotas potabilizadoras, una pastilla de jabón, una toalla, brújula, mapas, gafas de sol y crema solar factor extremo. También un bolígrafo, un blog de notas, un cargador para el móvil y otro para la cámara, así como un libro imprimido, de cuyas páginas me iría deshaciendo poco a poco, aligerando así mi mochila.

Para prepararme, aprovecharía el día a día para ir caminando al trabajo, e ir acostumbrando mis piernas a andar cada día varios kilómetros. Los fines de semana, recorrería distancias más largas para entrenar mi resistencia.

Por último, el factor más importante y difícil de planear consistía en la preparación mental. ¿Cómo me afectaría estar solo tantos días ante un desafío que me exigiría al máximo física y mentalmente? ¿Cómo impactaría la soledad en mi motivación? ¿Y la dificultad del reto? ¿Sería capaz de estar solo tantos días? ¿Cómo sobrellevaría el esfuerzo, el cansancio y, sobre todo, la soledad en momentos duros y, quién sabe, si peligrosos?

Cruzar los Pirineos de mar a mar

Cruzar los Pirineos desde el Cantábrico al Mediterráneo: de mar a mar. Hace mucho tiempo que llevo dibujando una línea imaginaria que recorre mis queridos Pirineos desde el Cabo Higuer en Euskadi hasta el Cap de Creus en Cataluña. Nada más y nada menos que 800 km de punta a punta, y alrededor de 50.000 metros de desnivel positivos por recorrer, entre paisajes idílicos y perdidos, picos majestuosos, horizontes lejanos y mucho tiempo para desconectar del ajetreo diario en la más absoluta soledad de la montaña.

Disfrutando de las vistas desde la cima del Bisaurín (2.670m)

Supongo que vivir en Bruselas, lejos de los Pirineos, agranda mi nostalgia y la necesidad que siento de perderme horas, días y acaso semanas en los bellos valles pirenaicos, cruzar sus ríos, ascender a sus cimas y ver el mundo desde lo alto. 

Ver cómo los problemas y las preocupaciones mundanas se desvanecen bajo un mar de nubes, tras un atardecer, bajo el cielo estrellado. Volver a las esencias, a lo básico y elemental: roca, aire, tierra, agua y tiempo. Ante todo, tiempo. Tiempo para pensar, tiempo para relajarse, tiempo para ver lo largos que son los días cuando se camina hacia el horizonte, tiempo para dar el siguiente paso, y uno más, y así pasos infinitos hasta llegar al final de la etapa, a un nuevo valle, un nuevo paisaje, nuevas amistades y nuevos descubrimientos, nombres nuevos, picos desconocidos, pueblos perdidos en las más profundas entrañas de los Pirineos. Lugares donde el tiempo se ha parado.

Cruzar los Pirineos de mar a mar siempre había sido un proyecto pendiente. Cada vez que me cruzaba con las marcas del GR-11, sentía ganas de seguir su trazado unos cuantos kilómetros más, ver qué es lo que había tras ese collado, subir hasta ese pico para perder la vista en los valles que se abrían al otro lado y tratar de adivinar, con menor acierto que el deseado, los nombres del mar de picos que se extendían hasta el horizonte.

Ahora bien, pasar de las ensoñaciones a la práctica es todo un reto en sí mismo. Y si no fuera por uno  de esos arrebatos que a veces me dan, quizás no estaría hoy aquí escribiendo estas líneas sobre un viaje mágico a mis montañas favoritas. Sucedió que, en una visita fugaz a Barcelona, me dio por entrar en la librería de viajes Altaïr y preguntar por los nuevos mapas del GR-11 de la editorial Alpina. Ya con los mapas en la mano, se abría ante mí una nueva fase para convertir este sueño en un proyecto de carne y hueso.

Y es que vivir en la capital de Europa tiene sus ventajas, aunque no se cuenten entre ellas las comunicaciones por tierra, mar o aire hasta los Pirineos. Porque llegar hasta Hondarribia, el inicio del GR-11, resulta ser más difícil de lo que parece. Tras muchos días dándole vueltas y buscando combinaciones imposibles, finalmente encontré la solución perfecta. Saldría un miércoles por la tarde en tren desde Bruselas a París, donde tendría una hora para cruzar desde Gare du Nord hasta Gare du Montparnasse (lástima no poder pasear unas horas por las bellas avenidas parisinas!), para desde ahí subir a un TGV que me llevaría en apenas 5 horas hasta Hendaya, la frontera con España. Una vez en Hendaya, sólo tendría que cruzar la frontera a pie y tomar un taxi hasta el Cabo Higuer.

Y así, con tan poco, germinó mi proyecto para cruzar los Pirineos, de mar a mar. 

Economic sanctions: past & future

Economic sanctions have been used since ancient times, yet it was only when the Cold War ended that they became increasingly popular as a tool of foreign policy. Whilst prior to 1989 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had only imposed sanctions on two occasions, between 1990 and 2000 it imposed sanctions on more than ten occasions, leading analysts to dub the 1990s as the "sanctions decade". This was triggered when the UN institutional paralysis, but also by the belief that sanctions could effectively enforce international norms and prevent conflict without the use of military force.  
 

However, the initial euphoria soon evolved into pessimism, as UN sanctions failed to stop conflicts in the Balkans, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Angola. Sceptics contended that sanctions were ineffective and counterproductive, as they often strengthened rather than weakened authoritarian regimes by sparking nationalism and helping those regimes rally domestic opposition against external pressure. Doubts also arose regarding the huge economic costs that comprehensive trade embargoes imposed on both sides of the dispute, but above all, criticism grew regarding the terrible humanitarian consequences that affected the innocent population in the targeted countries.

Whilst sanctions fatigue grew in the international community, the tipping point was reached when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and the UN imposed a trade embargo against the country. The comprehensive trade and financial sanctions of the 1990s led to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis where hundreds of thousands of people suffered under the scarcity of basic products, whilst Saddam Hussein and his regime were left untouched. Even worse, attempts to palliate the population’s suffering like the UN sponsored oil-for-food programme turned into a huge corruption scandal that further undermined the credibility of UN sanctions. As the decade approached its end, support for sanctions fell to very low levels in the international community. 

 

The (r)evolution of sanctions practice: the "smart sanctions" decade

Following the traumatic experience in Iraq, the UN and its members have since refrained from imposing comprehensive trade embargoes. However, far from burying this tool, Switzerland, Germany and Sweden propelled a UN-led process to learn from the mistakes of the past and to identify ways in which sanctions could be used in a more targeted and efficient way. By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, meetings took place in Interlaken, Berlin/Bonn and Stockholm to discuss issues regarding financial and travel restrictions, and arms embargoes. In addition, efforts were undertaken to enhance the implementation and monitoring of sanctions. 

The meetings gave birth to the concept of "smart" sanctions, which stress the need to tailor sanctions in such a way that only those individuals and entities responsible for the reprehensible actions are targeted, whilst the population is spared from any harm. Various reports were also published on how to improve the design and implementation of targeted sanctions. Yet, most importantly perhaps, the exchange of ideas that took place during this process led to an actual change in the sanctioning practice of the UN and its member states embraced the principles of "smart" sanctions.

The shift from comprehensive to targeted sanctions constituted a revolution in itself. First, the focus of targeted sanctions changed from political to technical considerations. Experts participating in the "smart sanctions" meetings drew attention to issues such as how to maintain support for sanctions, how to implement the measures and monitor them, and how to avoid evasion practices and negative externalities.

Second, the working panels aimed to clarify and systematize the technical aspects of the implementation stage. In this regard, a model law to harmonize the implementation of UNSC legislation at the member states' level was developed and a list of standardized language that could be employed in the drafting of UNSC resolutions was created.  

Finally, experts addressed polemic issues like the provision of legal safeguards for individuals and entities that had been targeted with sanctions. This matter led to discussions related to procedures that allowed for the removal of names from the sanctions blacklist, upon request. 

But this evolution in the sanctioning practice also reflected a more pragmatic approach to the use of sanctions, as acceptance that economic statecraft was not a silver bullet to enforce international norms led to a rationalization process to understand the possibilities and limitations of sanctions.

The limits and possibilities of sanctions 

A consequence of the “targetization” of sanctions has been the imposition of sub-optimal measures that can be easily circumvented or evaded by the targeted individuals or entities with the help of family members or the set-up of front companies. In consequence, most of the measures imposed after the 1990s have been more symbolic and irritating for those who have been targeted than anything else, as the actual impact of sanctions on their behaviour has been relatively low. 

However, this is only part of the story, as some cases of targeted sanctions have been far more successful. This is the case of sectorial sanctions, which target those sectors of a country’s economy that are necessary to initiate or fuel reprehensible policies like war, the invasion of foreign countries, or the proliferation of nuclear technology. For instance, UN restrictions on the import of blood diamonds from Liberia and Sierra Leone, or Western sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports and financial transactions are clear examples of such measures.

Albeit targeted, these measures lay in a grey area that extends between the most targeted and the most comprehensive sanctions. As such, they often have unintended effects that end up affecting many more than just the targeted entities and individuals. For example, financial sanctions against Iran's nuclear program have also impacted businesses that are not complicit in any way, while Western sanctions against Russia are putting many businesses that are unrelated to Putin’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine on the verge of bankruptcy. 

Prospects on the future use of sanctions

With governments ever more reluctant to send military troops abroad, sanctions have become a "cheap" and convenient option for countries to promote their foreign policy goals or to signal their disapproval with the unfolding of certain events. 

In fact, the most recent sanctions episodes against Iran and Russia reveal a political will to employ more coercive or “biting” measures, even though these are far away from the trade embargoes of the 1990s. While policy-makers in the US have shown their satisfaction with the efficacy of sectorial sanctions, regional organizations like the EU are leaving some taboos behind and are starting to love the “stick”. 

However, it would be mistaken to believe that sanctions by themselves provide a solution to the very problems they address. While sanctions might be useful to force a defiant regime to halt its behaviour and sit at the negotiation table, they do not constitute a silver bullet that automatically remedies the cause from which the dispute originated. Indeed, as the negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear program show, sanctions need to be accompanied by incentives and creative proposals that generate trust amongst the parties and help find appealing solutions that gives every party to the dispute something to gain.

The implications of sanctions against Russia

On 29 July the European Union (EU) imposed so-called tier three sanctions against Russia. The real effect of these measures is only starting to be felt now, yet the implications are far deeper than many had imagined. At stake is not only Europe’s geopolitical and regional stability; businesses and individuals on both sides of the table are starting to feel the impact of sanctions as well.

Uncertain ground

The new round of sanctions imposed on Russia is in many respects unprecedented. The EU has restricted Russian banks' access to long-term loans, it has imposed an embargo on the export of dual-use equipment for military use, and it has banned the export of a wide range of items and technology related to the oil industry. The gas sector, however, has been left untouched so far. These measures go far beyond the visa-bans and assets freezes that were already in place against certain individuals involved in the destabilization of Ukraine.

But sanctions are also unprecedented for another reason: the EU had never before imposed economic sanctions against a country with which it shares so many commercial, energetic, and security ties. While the EU has had some experience - and some would even argue success - in the use of economic sanctions against Iran, this time it has entered into unchartered waters.  And few seem to have thought thoroughly through the consequences of these measures.

Far from forcing Putin to back down and put a break to his ambitions in Eastern Ukraine, sanctions have contributed to harden his position. Moreover, and even though unintended, they have sparked a nationalistic flare in Russia, with polls registering a spike in Putin's popularity. Yet while Putin rallies support at home, the EU and the US are unwilling to go back to business as usual with him after the traumatic redrawing of Europe's borders by an ever assertive Russia. Escalation has thus led to a political deadlock were neither Putin nor the West are willing to make unilateral concessions to solve the crisis. And given the unlikely prospect of a direct military confrontation between the two parts, a war of economic attrition seems the only scenario left. With a solution to the regional crisis slipping away, the coercive effect of sanctions is starting to be felt on both sides.

The economic costs of sanctions

Although no one knows for sure what the real cost of sanctions is, one thing is certain: they are imposing a huge economic burden on Russia. The flow of international investment into Russia has stalled, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has frozen all new projects in the country. Moreover, Russian banks have seen their access to Western capital cut. This has increased the refinancing costs of banks, making it increasingly difficult for Russia to pay its debt and limiting the Kremlin’s capacity to invest and modernize infrastructure, especially in the extraction sector.

Furthermore, the rouble has kept falling against the dollar increasing the cost of imports. These difficulties add to the shortages of products in supermarkets caused by Putin’s ban on imports of food and agricultural products from the EU, which has backfired forcing businesses to struggle for substitutes in an underdeveloped domestic market. To make things worse, inflation is expected to soar in the coming year.

Yet the most daunting task Putin has yet to face is an uncertain future with increasingly low oil prices. With more than half of Russia’s revenues originating in the export of oil and gas, financing the budget deficit is likely to become challenging. Also, if prices remain low in the longer run, Russia is likely to have a bigger problem, as its economy is stagnating and its budgetary estimations are based on high oil and gas prices.

However, sanctions are having their toll in Europe as well. Most importantly, sanctions have generated an immense uncertainty amongst business circles. European firms are trying to make sense of the limitations and scope that sanctions impose on their commercial activities, including trade, investment and insurance operations with third parties operating in Ukraine and Russia. Due to the legal consequences that businesses could face in case of violation of sanctions, concerns have arisen regarding the extent to which it is possible to carry on with their regular activities.

Unfortunately, complying with sanctions is not a straightforward task. Besides the difficulties to understand what it is allowed and what is not due to a lack of clear regulatory provisions and national or European guidelines, other issues such as linguistic differences between EU and US provisions - i.e. concepts like "derivatives" mean different things in the US and the EU - posit further challenges for private companies. As a consequence, businesses are devoting increasing economic and human resources to make sure they comply with current EU and US legislation.

However, the biggest concern for EU policy-makers is the fear of Russian retaliation. Putin's ban on food and agricultural imports from the EU has already had a very negative impact on Southern European farmers. And whilst the European Commission has reacted swiftly by setting up a compensation fund to pay for export losses, new retaliatory sanctions are looming in the horizon that might generate bigger disruptions for European economies.

The most obvious concern for some EU member states relates to a potential cut of Russian gas supplies during the winter. Putin has warned EU countries and Ukraine that they could see the flow of gas stopped if the latter does not manage to pay its debts. Since the most important pipelines connecting Russia with EU countries cross Ukrainian territory, anxiety amongst member states that are heavily dependent on EU gas have grown.

But the Kremlin has also threatened to impose other countermeasures. First, it has insinuated that it could close its airspace to EU commercial flights. This would substantially increase the cost and duration of European flights to Asia, as airlines would have to divert to longer routes, consequently requiring larger amounts of fuel. And second, Putin has remained passive to a legislative action in the Russian Duma that would allow to nationalize foreign assets to pay for the losses of Russian companies.

The geopolitical implications of sanctions

Whilst the current deadlock between the West and Russia over Ukraine remains, other actors have taken advantage of the situation. Latin American countries have been keen to replace the EU's exports of food and agricultural produce following Putin's ban on EU imports and have ignored EU pledges not to do so.

Most strikingly, and even though the EU has managed to convince most of the countries on the path to EU membership to align themselves with its sanctions regime, Serbia has refused to do so, rolling out the red carpet for Putin's visit to Belgrade last week instead.

The EU's incapacity to convince its allies to support its sanctions regime has also been evident in Asia, where Japan has only imposed mild sanctions on Russia and where South Korea has refrained from imposing any measure whatsoever.

Yet the indisputable benefiter of Western sanctions has been China. Since the beginning of the crisis, China has played an ever important role, with Russia moving closer to its eastern neighbour. The relation between both countries has improved substantially in the last months, leading to a historic agreement on the construction of gas pipelines from Russia to China.

Regional tensions are also mounting in other parts of Europe, as the Swedish government has been involved in the chase of an (allegedly) Russian submarine in its territorial waters and as Russian spy planes have repeatedly violated Estonia's and Sweden's air space.

A way out?

The mutual trust that has been built between the West and Russia since the end of the Cold War has vanished. Undoubtedly, sanctions stand in the way to improving the relationship with the Kremlin, yet the EU is not willing to lift them without prior changes in Russia's behaviour. Sanctions are thus likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future, with all the uncertainty that this implies.

However, the political deadlock should not be read as a new version of the Cold War. Russia is now much more integrated into the world economy, it has become a member of the World Trade Organization and it largely depends on its exports of oil and gas to keep its economy afloat.

Moreover, it is questionable that Russia's new economic and political opening to Asia, and especially to China, constitutes a feasible long term alternative, as it will lead to an uncomfortable asymmetric relationship for the Kremlin. Whether this shift actually takes place remains to be seen, but it is more likely that Russia veers again towards Europe in the next few years.

The current uncertainty makes it hard to predict what will happen next or how long the conflict is likely to persist. The only thing that seems clear is that Crimea's annexation by Russia is now an irreversible process. Russia will struggle to find international recognition for its action, and the West is likely to keep sanctions against the peninsula in place until a solution is eventually found in the future. But for the time being, this is likely to become yet another frozen conflict in the heart of Europe.

While many questions remain unanswered, Western analysts are starting to accept that the standoff is going to last longer than initially expected. A solution to the crisis is however not impossible, but it will require huge doses of imagination, patience and, above all, time. As time passes and sanctions impose higher costs on both sides, incentives should emerge to normalize relations with the parts. The signing of a gas deal between Russia, Ukraine and the EU is a step in the right direction, yet it needs to be backed by a strong legal and political commitment by all parts. This could then lead to more compromises regarding the situation in Eastern Ukraine.

The EU’s ‘tougher’ sanctions against Russia must be used as a step toward greater engagement, not simply as a punishment

After months of discussions, EU leaders have finally agreed to impose the so-called “tier three” sanctions against Russia, which will target broad sectors of the Russian economy. Although this decision responds to the failure of repeated threats to deter Putin from supporting Pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine, EU leaders only reached agreement after the commercial air carrier MH17 from Malaysia Airlines was allegedly shot down by the rebels.

Sanctions are expected to have an important economic cost for Russia, yet it is far from clear that this will automatically lead to a solution to the conflict. In fact, as happened with Iran, broad economic sanctions could also contribute to a further isolation of Russia. This would be highly detrimental to efforts to solve other problems worldwide, as Russia is still a key player in the United Nations and in the Mediterranean (e.g. with regard to issues like Syria).

It is also unclear whether Russia will yield to the pressure of sanctions. In fact, as the Sino-Russian meeting at the end of May showed, Putin is likely to turn to China to strengthen the economic ties with the Asian giant and to find alternative markets for Russian exports. This could undermine the effectiveness of sanctions in changing Russia’s stance towards the Ukrainian conflict.

Moreover, economic pain will not automatically translate into a change of Russian attitude. After all, Russia’s economic and security interests are not going to change in the short term. To make this point clear, the Kremlin has already threatened Ukraine with a food import ban if it ratifies the Association Agreement that it has already signed with the EU. A similar ban is likely to follow against EU fruit exports to Russia. Most worrying of all, EU and Ukrainian leaders can also expect an interruption of gas supplies to Europe this winter.

Nevertheless, economic sanctions might succeed in halting the flow of Russian arms over the Ukrainian border and in bringing an end to violence. As Jan Techau has argued, the only way of establishing a good relationship with Russia is by showing a firm position: ‘Weakness invites Russia’s disdain and aggression. Robustness creates a constructive atmosphere’. Hence, the failed Geneva talks in April might have been more successful if the threat of strong economic sanctions had accompanied the EU’s negotiating delegation.

However, the EU’s need to show resolve in its relationship with Russia points to another problem that looms on the horizon: how should the EU engage with Russia in the long term? Although sanctions might enhance the EU’s position in the current crisis and force Putin to the negotiating table, the EU needs to make clear what it expects from its eastern neighbour in the future and to design a strategy accordingly.

The EU cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of its accommodating approach to the Kremlin. This has not only failed to integrate Russia into the club of democratic nations of Europe; it has also contributed toward sustaining and strengthening an increasingly assertive, corrupt and repressive state that is willing to revise the existing sovereign order by force. Dealing with such a country will be difficult as long as the EU and its member states tolerate the authoritarian excesses of Putin.

Sanctions will strain the relationship with Russia even more. But they will also open new spaces for accommodating the interests and concerns of the two parts. The EU needs to use these opportunities to set clear and specific goals about its ambitions and expectations regarding Russia. In particular, it has to be certain that its relationship with the Kremlin can only improve if it is based on political reciprocity. This implies that the EU should be ready to back its words with economic coercion if necessary, but also that it should offer Russia incentives to co-operate.

Most importantly, the EU cannot continue expanding eastwards without expecting some political fallout in its relations with Russia. Although its promotion of Association Agreements with former Soviet countries responds to the latter’s sovereign desire to join the EU to foster economic growth and prosperity, the EU cannot simply ignore Realpolitik considerations when it proceeds with these agreements.

Finally, the EU has to reassess the possibilities of integrating its eastern neighbour into the legal and institutional framework of Europe. Change in Russia will only occur slowly and from within, but the EU can help by making its help and co-operation conditional on the achievement of specific targets. This could be achieved through the revival of existing institutional frameworks like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Inevitably, the implementation of tier three sanctions is likely to occupy the minds of EU leaders in the foreseeable weeks. However, EU policy-makers would be wrong to conceive of these sanctions as a goal in themselves. Rather, they should start thinking of sanctions as a means to engage with Russia, and not simply as a punishment. Only in this way might sanctions be of help to address the “Russian problem”.

 

This article was first published at the LSE EUROPP blog on 30 July 2014

Will Eastern Ukraine become Crimea 2.0?

After weeks of speculations, the phantom of separatism in Ukraine is back. Heavily armed gunmen have stormed various official buildings in the main cities of the country’s east. The striking similitudes with the tensions experienced in Crimea in the last month are by no means coincidental. First, unidentified paramilitary troops have occupied several public buildings to then proclaim the independence of the region. At the same time arms depots are being stormed, weapons are distributed amongst the rebels and key strategic positions are being taken control of. Presumably, the next step will entail the call for a referendum on independence that will eventually lead parts of Eastern Ukraine to join the Russian Federation.

Whilst tensions in Eastern Ukraine rise, the rift between the West and Russia is also increasing. The last meeting of the UN Security Council resulted in an exchange of accusations between Western powers on the one hand, and Russia on the other. EU foreign ministers met to discuss the new crisis on Monday, while the US is increasing the tone of its discourse and has accused Russia of destabilizing Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia has warned the West that it is in its hands to avoid a civil war. In light of this, Ukraine seems yet again condemned to an imminent break-up of its territory.

Many observe the situation with perplexity and a feeling of impotence. What, if anything, can be done to avoid this crisis to escalate even further?

Somewhat disconcertingly, both the West and the government in Kiev have again been taken by surprise by the speed of the events, even though analysts have been speculating with the current scenario for weeks. Many in the West are reluctant to pursue a harder line against Russia due to fears of Russian retaliation. This is especially evident in countries like Germany, Hungary, Slovakia or Greece that are heavily dependent on Russian gas, but not so in Poland or the Baltic states who have instead opted for a firmer stance vis-à-vis Russia. Moscow is also successfully blackmailing the West, reminding it of its own inconsistencies in Iraq, Kosovo or Libya. The decisions made by the West in the past are thus backfiring in a crucial moment that requires proactive involvement and leadership, not remorse.

However, past mistakes should not stop the West from finding creative solutions to the crisis. In fact, the US and to a larger extent the EU can still contribute to a peaceful outcome, but this will require more than good faith. Most importantly, it will demand a clear roadmap that leads to an immediate de-escalation of the situation in the short term and to the stabilization of Ukraine in the longer run. And this, in turn, involves pragmatism towards Russia.

Yet de-escalation should not be confused with backing down. Indeed, the West’s reluctance to oppose Putin’s moves in Crimea has largely contributed to the current crisis. While the US has been keen to impose sanctions on Russian officials and entities, the EU’s response has been very mild so far. As could be expected, yesterday’s EU Foreign Affairs Council only agreed to add new names to the EU’s sanctions blacklists. Such strategy will hardly impose any costs on Russia, who is anyways willing to go further in its destabilization efforts. The West’s division and its symbolic response to Russian expansionism are sending an unmistakeable message to Putin, who is currently putting the West under a new stress test.

Paradoxically as it might be though, de-escalation might only be achieved through a combination of carrots and sticks. Sanctioning Russia without offering it any incentive to solve the current crisis is, simply put, a waste of time. Conversely, buying time for negotiations while imposing symbolic yet ineffective sanctions such as visa bans and assets freezes won’t do the trick either. In fact, these measures might simply look absurd and obsolete when the foreign ministers of the US, Russia, Ukraine and Catherine Ashton meet this Thursday in Geneva.

The West needs to understand that the stakes are high for Russia and that any coercive act will lead nowhere unless the concerns of Moscow are taken into consideration. Yet at the same time it needs to accept that the only way of negotiating with Putin is by levelling the playing field. This implies two things. First, the US and the EU need to get Russia on the negotiation table and make sure that it is part of the solution, not the problem. Although many would like to leave Russia out of the equation, this is neither possible, nor desirable. At the same time, the West needs to tell Putin that not playing along will have severe economic and political costs for Russia.

Finally, de-escalation will entail a huge diplomatic effort to make sure that Russia takes part and actively supports the elections of the 25^th of May. After all, only a newly elected government can claim the legitimacy that the acting Ukrainian government lacks. Ideally, the elections should be supervised by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – that is, with Russia on board – and give way to a government of national unity to avoid exclusionary politics. In turn, the new government should commit to respect the rights of Russian and other minorities, promote decentralization and grant more autonomy to certain regions and, most importantly, generate economic growth and political stability. EU financial assistance could be a stepping stone in this direction.

However, the 25^th of May is still far away. Until then, the situation could deteriorate quickly and Eastern Ukraine could become Crimea 2.0. Whether this will be the case will largely depend on the West’s capacity to act swiftly and convincingly to anticipate Putin’s moves and take the diplomatic initiative. Unfortunately, time is not on the West’s side.

Mas y el cuento de la lechera europea

9 de Noviembre de 2014. El pueblo catalán vota a favor de la independencia. Es un hecho consumado: no hay vuelta atrás. La pelota está en el tejado de Europa. Ante la evidencia, Catalunya es admitida como candidato a integrar la Unión Europea. Tras rápidas negociaciones sin complicaciones, Catalunya se convierte en nuevo Estado miembro del club europeo.

Bien, hasta aquí el cuento de la lechera. El futuro europeo que desde hace meses llevan planteando Artur Mas y sus correligionarios independentistas es, sencillamente, un cuento. Ayer cruzaron una línea roja: plantear un referéndum unilateral sin tan siquiera plantear una negociación con el gobierno español. De acuerdo, no es que podamos fiarnos demasiado de las buenas intenciones de Mariano y compañía. Pero ¿era necesario llegar hasta este extremo?

Pese a la falta de voluntad y capacidad de liderazgo mostrada por Mas en los últimos meses, me llama la atención una novedad en la formulación de las preguntas del referéndum: la eliminación de la palabra "Europa". ¿Acaso alguien recuerda otra pregunta en la que se cuestionaba si queríamos que Cataluña fuera un nuevo Estado de Europa? Mas ha demostrado nuevamente su aptitud para la magia: ¡de una pregunta trampa, hace dos, y además hace desaparecer a Europa! Todo un logro.

¿Pero qué ha sucedido para que de repente Europa haya quedado fuera de la(s) pregunta(s)? ¿Es que acaso el Govern ha desistido en querer pertenecer a la UE? A mi parecer, no. Simplemente creo que el President ha entendido que seguir por esa línea iba a dejarlo, tarde o temprano, en clara evidencia. Sin embargo, por mucho que él y sus partidarios se esfuercen en dibujar el futuro de una Catalunya independiente dentro de Europa, han preferido dejar este asunto de lado - o al menos, temporalmente. Así que sin Europa en juego, el debate es entre España y Catalunya.

Sin embargo, creo que los partidarios de celebrar un referéndum de manera unilateral han cometido un error de calado al no querer asumir las consecuencias políticas que un potencial "sí" tendría para la situación de Catalunya respecto a Europa. Y es que plantear semejante pulso político al gobierno español puede tener serias consecuencias en el futuro si Catalunya alcanzara la independencia. La más obvia, quedarse fuera de Europa.


Por mucho que los defensores del "sí" se hayan empleado a fondo en la búsqueda de argumentos jurídicos y económicos para desmitificar la amenaza de ser excluidos del club europeo, los mensajes provenientes del mismo son muy claros: si Catalunya se independiza, dejará de ser parte de la UE. Evidentemente, Catalunya podría presentar su candidatura para ingresar nuevamente en la Unión, esta vez como país independiente.

Ahora bien, las probabilidades de que el proceso de adhesión se estanque son altas. Como bien saben los expertos en integración europea, entrar en la UE es, ante todo, un proceso político en el que el veto de un solo Estado miembro puede poner fin a la adeshión catalana. Es por ello que las formas son tan importantes en política, más aun cuando hablamos de Europa.

El planteamiento de un referéndum unilateral ha sido un guantazo a las aspiraciones de una independencia catalana con un futuro europeo. Ante el desagravio histórico que una hipotética independencia unilateral supondría, el veto español a la adhesión catalana estaría asegurado. Y el cántaro del sueño europeo se habría hecho pedazos.

Es cierto que todo esto son conjeturas. Pero si nuestros líderes políticos siguen adelante con su pulso, estos escenarios hipotéticos pueden convertirse en una realidad. Y a no ser que nuestros representantes hagan un esfuerzo para sentarse a negociar y a pactar, es mejor que empecemos a hablar sin trampas sobre los inciertos escenarios a los que nos están llevando un liderazgo irresponsable.