Economic sanctions have been used since ancient times, yet it was only when the Cold War ended that they became increasingly popular as a tool of foreign policy. Whilst prior to 1989 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had only imposed sanctions on two occasions, between 1990 and 2000 it imposed sanctions on more than ten occasions, leading analysts to dub the 1990s as the "sanctions decade". This was triggered when the UN institutional paralysis, but also by the belief that sanctions could effectively enforce international norms and prevent conflict without the use of military force.
However,
the initial euphoria soon evolved into pessimism, as UN sanctions failed to
stop conflicts in the Balkans, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Angola. Sceptics
contended that sanctions were ineffective
and counterproductive, as they often strengthened rather than weakened authoritarian
regimes by sparking nationalism and helping those regimes rally domestic
opposition against external pressure. Doubts also arose regarding the huge
economic costs that comprehensive trade embargoes imposed on both sides of the dispute,
but above all, criticism grew regarding the terrible humanitarian consequences
that affected the innocent population in the targeted countries.
Whilst
sanctions fatigue grew in the international community, the tipping point was
reached when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and the UN imposed a trade embargo
against the country. The comprehensive trade and financial sanctions of the 1990s
led to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis where hundreds of thousands of
people suffered under the scarcity of basic products, whilst Saddam Hussein and
his regime were left untouched. Even worse, attempts to palliate the
population’s suffering like the UN sponsored oil-for-food programme turned into
a huge corruption
scandal that further undermined the credibility of UN sanctions. As the decade approached
its end, support for sanctions fell to very low levels in the international
community.
The (r)evolution of sanctions practice: the
"smart sanctions" decade
Following
the traumatic experience in Iraq, the UN and its members have since refrained
from imposing comprehensive trade embargoes. However, far from burying this
tool, Switzerland, Germany and Sweden propelled a UN-led process to learn from
the mistakes of the past and to identify ways in which sanctions could be used
in a more targeted
and efficient way. By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, meetings
took place in Interlaken, Berlin/Bonn and Stockholm to discuss issues regarding
financial and travel restrictions, and arms embargoes. In addition, efforts
were undertaken to enhance the implementation and monitoring of sanctions.
The
meetings gave birth to the concept of "smart" sanctions, which stress
the need to tailor sanctions in such a way that only those individuals and
entities responsible for the reprehensible actions are targeted, whilst the population
is spared from any harm. Various reports were also published on how to improve
the design and implementation of targeted sanctions. Yet, most importantly
perhaps, the exchange of ideas that took place during this process led to an
actual change in the sanctioning practice of the UN and its member states embraced
the principles of "smart" sanctions.
The
shift from comprehensive to targeted sanctions constituted a revolution in
itself. First, the focus of targeted sanctions changed from political to
technical considerations. Experts participating in the "smart
sanctions" meetings drew attention to issues such as how to maintain
support for sanctions, how to implement the measures and monitor them, and how
to avoid evasion practices and negative externalities.
Second,
the working panels aimed to clarify and systematize the technical aspects of
the implementation stage. In this regard, a model law to harmonize the
implementation of UNSC legislation at the member states' level was developed and
a list of standardized language that could be employed in the drafting of UNSC
resolutions was created.
Finally,
experts addressed polemic issues like the provision of legal safeguards for
individuals and entities that had been targeted with sanctions. This matter led
to discussions related to procedures that allowed for the removal of names from
the sanctions blacklist, upon request.
But this
evolution in the sanctioning practice also reflected a more pragmatic approach
to the use of sanctions, as acceptance that economic statecraft was not a
silver bullet to enforce international norms led to a rationalization process
to understand the possibilities and limitations of sanctions.
The limits and possibilities of sanctions
A
consequence of the “targetization” of sanctions has been the imposition of
sub-optimal measures that can be easily circumvented or evaded by the targeted
individuals or entities with the help of family members or the set-up of front
companies. In consequence, most of the measures imposed after the 1990s have
been more symbolic and irritating for those who have been targeted than anything
else, as the actual impact of sanctions on their behaviour has been relatively low.
However,
this is only part of the story, as some cases of targeted sanctions have been
far more successful. This is the case of sectorial sanctions, which target those
sectors of a country’s economy that are necessary to initiate or fuel
reprehensible policies like war, the invasion of foreign countries, or the proliferation
of nuclear technology. For instance, UN restrictions on the import of blood
diamonds from Liberia and Sierra Leone, or Western sanctions targeting Iranian oil
exports and financial transactions are clear examples of such measures.
Albeit
targeted, these measures lay in a grey area that extends between the most
targeted and the most comprehensive sanctions. As such, they often have
unintended effects that end up affecting many more than just the targeted entities
and individuals. For example, financial sanctions against Iran's nuclear
program have also impacted businesses that are not complicit in any way, while Western
sanctions against Russia are putting many businesses that are unrelated to Putin’s
aggressive policy towards Ukraine on the verge of bankruptcy.
Prospects on the future use of sanctions
With
governments ever more reluctant to send military troops abroad, sanctions have
become a "cheap" and convenient option for countries to promote their
foreign policy goals or to signal their disapproval with the unfolding of
certain events.
In
fact, the most recent sanctions episodes against Iran and Russia reveal a political
will to employ more coercive or “biting” measures, even though these are far away
from the trade embargoes of the 1990s. While policy-makers in the US have shown
their satisfaction with the efficacy of sectorial sanctions, regional
organizations like the EU are leaving some taboos behind and are starting to
love the “stick”.
However,
it would be mistaken to believe that sanctions by themselves provide a solution
to the very problems they address. While sanctions might be useful to force a
defiant regime to halt its behaviour and sit at the negotiation table, they do
not constitute a silver bullet that automatically remedies the cause from which
the dispute originated. Indeed, as the negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear
program show, sanctions need to be accompanied by incentives and creative
proposals that generate trust amongst the parties and help find appealing
solutions that gives every party to the dispute something to gain.
